Discrete-time stochastic games with a finite number of states have been widely applied to study the strategic interactions among forward-looking players in dynamic environments. However, these games suffer from a "curse of dimensionality" since the cost of computing players' expectations over all possible future states increases exponentially in the number of state variables. We explore the alternative of continuous-time stochastic games with a finite number of states and show that continuous time has substantial advantages. Most important, continuous time avoids the curse of dimensionality, thereby speeding up the computations by orders of magnitude in games with more than a few state variables. This much smaller computational burden greatly extends the range and richness of applications of stochastic games.
Introduction
Discrete-time stochastic games with a finite number of states are central to the analysis of strategic interactions among forward-looking players in dynamic environments. The usefulness of discrete-time games, however, is limited by their computational burden; in particular, there is a "curse of dimensionality" since the cost of computing players' expectations over all possible future states increases exponentially in the number of state variables. In this paper we examine the alternative of continuous-time games with a finite number of states and show that they avoid the curse of dimensionality. As a consequence, continuous-time games with more than a few state variables are orders of magnitude faster to solve than their discrete-time counterparts. Whether an economic problem is best modeled in continuous or discrete time depends not only on the computational burden but also on the details of the institutional and technological setting. We argue that continuous-time formulations of games are often natural. Overall, the continuous-time approach offers a computationally and conceptually promising alternative to modeling dynamic strategic interactions.
Dating back to Shapley (1953) , discrete-time stochastic games with a finite number of states have a long tradition in economics. A well-known example is the Ericson & Pakes (1995) (hereafter, EP) model of dynamic competition in an oligopolistic industry with investment, entry, and exit. The EP model has triggered a large and active literature in industrial organization (see Doraszelski & Pakes (2007) for a survey) and, most recently, has been used also in other fields such as international trade (Erdem & Tybout 2003) and finance (Goettler, Parlour & Rajan 2005 , Kadyrzhanova 2006 ). Because such models are generally too complex to be solved analytically, Pakes & McGuire (1994) (hereafter, PM1) present an algorithm to solve numerically for a Markov perfect equilibrium.
Unfortunately, the range of applications of discrete-time, finite-state stochastic games is limited by their high computational cost. As Pakes & McGuire (2001) (hereafter, PM2) point out, computing players' expectations over all possible future states of the game is subject to a curse of dimensionality in that the computational burden is increasing exponentially in the number of state variables, i.e., the dimension of the state vector. Suppose that a player can move to one of K states from one period to the next. Given that there are K possibilities for each of N players, there are K N possibilities for the future state of the game, and computing the expectation over all these successor states therefore involves summing over K N terms. Because of this exponential increase of the computational burden, applications of discrete-time games are constrained to a handful of players. The computational burden also restricts heterogeneity among players. For example, a typical application of EP's framework may allow the competing firms to differ from each other in terms of either their production capacity or their product quality, but not both. In short, the computational constraints are often binding in important problems and, as Pakes (2000) contends, this causes modeling choices to "become dominated by their computational (rather than their substantive) implications" (p. 38).
In this paper we develop continuous-time stochastic games with a finite number of states. 1 We view a dynamic stochastic game as a collection of interrelated single-agent Markov decision problems. While less widely used in economics, continuous-time Markov decision problems are as tractable as their discrete-time counterparts and, dating back to Chap. 11 of Bellman (1957) and Chap. 8 of Howard (1960) , have a common history in the mathematics and operations research literatures.
We show that specifying stochastic games in continuous time has computational advantages because it avoids the curse of dimensionality in computing expectations. In contrast to a discrete-time game, the possibility of two or more players' states changing simultaneously disappears in a continuous-time game under standard assumptions on the transition laws (see Section 2.3 for details). This is not a restriction on the behavior of players; rather it reflects the fact that changes happen one by one as time passes. The absence of simultaneous changes implies that the expectation over successor states in the discrete-time game is replaced by a much smaller sum in the continuous-time game and results in a simpler, and computationally much more tractable, model: while computing the expectation over successor states in the discrete-time game involves summing over K N terms, it merely requires adding up (K − 1)N terms in the continuous-time game. This eliminates the curse of dimensionality and accelerates the computations by orders of magnitude for games with more than a few state variables.
From the point of view of theory a continuous-time model is similar to a discrete-time model with short periods. In practice, however, there may be substantial differences between a discrete-and a continuous-time formulation of an economic problem because discrete-time models must work with long periods. Moreover, the discrete-time Markov chains underlying many applications of EP's framework cannot be exactly matched to continuous-time Markov chains.
The period length in a discrete-time model is implicitly determined by the discount factor. Moreover, the larger the discount factor, the slower is the convergence of the discretetime algorithm (see Section 5.2 for details). This is why discrete-time models must work with small discount factors such as β = 0.925 in EP, PM1, and PM2 that imply long periods.
For example, if a firm can borrow at a real interest rate of 2%, 2 then β = 0.925 implies a period length of almost four years. Given that many economic processes unfold in close to continuous time, shorter periods are often desirable.
The so-called embedding problem is another source of differences between discrete-and continuous-time games: The discrete-time Markov chains underlying many applications of EP's framework cannot be exactly matched to continuous-time Markov chains in the sense 1 Our approach differs from continuous-time games with a continuum of states which date back to Isaacs (1954) (zero-sum games) and Starr & Ho (1969) (nonzero-sum games); see Basar & Olsder (1999) for a standard presentation of differential games and Dockner, Jorgensen, Van Long & Sorger (2000) for a survey of applications.
2 Mehra (2003) reports that the average real return on a relatively riskless security was about 1% during the twentieth century. that it may not be possible to construct continuous-time Markov chains that induce the same probability distribution over states at all discrete times t = 0, 1, 2, . . . (see Section 6.1 for details). In this sense, discrete-time Markov chains are richer than continuous-time Markov chains. It is worth noting, however, that applications of EP's framework preclude embeddability by restricting players' transitions to immediately adjacent states. This assumption is often made more to control the computational burden of discrete-time models than for substantive reasons and, in fact, may be undesirable in some settings.
Taken together the long periods in discrete-time models and the embedding problem mean that several issues have to be considered in deciding between a continuous-and a discrete-time formulation of an economic problem. First, in contrast to a continuous-time model, a discrete-time model limits how often and typically also how much a state variable can change over a finite interval of time. Second, in a discrete-time model a player may react to a change in a rival's state by changing its action but, in contrast to a continuous-time model, the player must wait at least a period before this brings about a change in its own state. Third, some dynamic phenomena such as predictable seasonal fluctuations in demand or cost and, more generally, calendar time are more easily modeled in discrete time. Our continuous-time approach also rules out deterministic transitions from one state to another.
The more general point here is that continuous-and discrete-time models are different, and both are limited in their ability to accurately represent the real world. The central question is whether a continuous-or a discrete-time model is a better approximation of the economic process under study. The correct answer depends on the details of the institutional and technological setting and must thus be determined on a case-by-case basis.
None of these differences between discrete-and continuous-time models should distract from the fact that in many cases there are no compelling economic reasons for either discrete or continuous time. A case in point is the quality ladder model developed by PM1 that we use as a running example in this paper. In a case like this, the computational advantages of continuous time may be decisive on their own right. In fact, most existing applications of EP's framework could have been formulated in continuous instead of discrete time with substantial computational savings. To give the reader a sense of the magnitude of these savings, we compare the performance of an algorithm that is closely related to PM1. In discrete time the algorithm uses over 84 hours per iteration in a model with N = 14 players and K = 3 possible transitions per player while in continuous time the algorithm uses 2.93 seconds per iteration, over 100, 000 times faster. Partly offsetting this gain is the fact that for comparable continuous-time games the algorithm needs more iterations to converge to the equilibrium. This loss, however, is small when compared to the gain from avoiding the curse of dimensionality. In the example with N = 14 players, continuous time beats discrete time by a factor of almost 30, 000. To put this number in perspective, while it takes about 20 minutes to compute an equilibrium of the continuous-time game, it would take over a year to compute an equilibrium of the discrete-time game! Overall, we believe that the advantages of continuous time are often substantial and open the way to study more complex and realistic stochastic games than currently feasible.
In addition, the much smaller computational burden of continuous-time games has at least two other benefits. The quite large computational burden of discrete-time games often limits the researcher to computing the equilibrium for just a few sets or, in the extreme, for just one set of parameter values (e.g., Fershtman & Pakes 2000) . While one parameterization is sufficient to demonstrate that something can happen in equilibrium, it is insufficient to explore the comparative statics/dynamics properties of the equilibrium. Gaining a more thorough understanding of strategic behavior in dynamic settings therefore requires the ability to compute equilibria quickly for many different parameterizations. Our continuoustime approach may also be useful in empirical work on stochastic games since many standard estimation procedures require computing the equilibrium hundreds or even thousands of times. 3 But even if the goal is simply to conduct policy experiments based on estimated parameters, the ability to compute equilibria quickly is key to establishing the robustness of the conclusions.
In this paper we compare our continuous-time model to the discrete-time model as written down by EP, PM1, PM2, and the subsequent literature (e.g., Gowrisankaran 1999a , Fershtman & Pakes 2000 , Benkard 2004 ). However, there are many ways to formulate discrete-time models, and some of them are computationally more tractable than others.
Consider a model where each period one player is picked at random to choose an action.
The state of the player with the move then changes in response to its chosen action. Then another random draw is taken to pick a player, and so on. This model may thus be thought of as a "random-leadership Stackelberg game" whereas both the discrete-time model in EP and our continuous-time model are "Nash games." The Stackelberg game is an example of a discrete-time model that does not suffer from the curse of dimensionality in computing the expectation over successor states. In ongoing research we show that it is indeed faster to solve than the discrete-time model in EP-though not as fast as our continuous-time model-and we discuss the range of economic problems that may be modeled in this fashion (Doraszelski & Judd 2007) .
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic elements of discrete-and continuous-time stochastic games with a finite number of states and shows that continuous time avoids the curse of dimensionality. Section 3 presents our computational strategies for both models. Section 4 formulates discrete-and continuous-time versions of the quality ladder model of PM1. Section 5 compares the performance of the discrete-and continuous-time algorithms and Section 6 discusses a number of conceptual differences between continuous-and discrete-time models. Section 7 concludes.
Models
In this section we first describe the discrete-and continuous-time approaches to finite-state stochastic games. Then we show that continuous time avoids the curse of dimensionality inherent in discrete-time models.
Discrete-Time Model
A discrete-time stochastic game with a finite number of states is often just called a "stochastic game" (Filar & Vrieze 1997 , Basar & Olsder 1999 . Time is discrete and the horizon is infinite. We let Ω denote the finite set of possible states; the state of the game in period t is ω t ∈ Ω. We assume that there are N players. Player i's action (also called his control or pol-
, where X i (ω t ) is the set of feasible actions for player i in state ω t . We make no specific assumptions about X i (ω t ), which may be one-or multidimensional, discrete or continuous. The collection of players' actions in period t is x t = x 1 t , . . . , x N t . We follow the usual convention of letting x
The state follows a controlled discrete-time, finite-state, first-order Markov process.
Specifically, if the state in period t is ω t and the players choose actions x t , then the probability that the state in period t + 1 is ω is Pr (ω |ω t , x t ). In applications such as EP, ω t is a vector partitioned into (ω 1 t , . . . , ω N t ), where ω i t denotes the (one or more) coordinates of the state that describe player i (e.g., the player's production capacity and/or product quality). We refer to ω i t as the state of player i and to ω t as the state of the game. Many applications assume that transitions in player i's state are controlled by player i's actions and are independent of the actions of other players and transitions in their states. In this case the law of motion can be written as
where
is the transition probability for player i's state. Our example in Section 4 assumes independent transitions since this allows us to cleanly illustrate the computational advantages of continuous time but, as we point out in Section 2.3, our insights are not limited to this special case.
We decompose payoffs into two components. First, in period t player i receives a payoff equal to π i (x t , ω t ) when players' actions are x t and the state is ω t . For example, if ω t is a list of firms' capacities and x t lists their output and investment decisions, then π i (x t , ω t )
represents firm i's profit from product market competition net of investment expenses.
Second, at the end of period t player i receives a payoff if there is a change in the state.
Specifically, Φ i (x t , ω t , ω t+1 ) is the change in the wealth of player i at the end of period t if the state moves from ω t to ω t+1 = ω t (think of the transition as occurring at the end of the period) and players' actions were x t . 4 For example, if a firm searches for a buyer of a piece of equipment it wants to sell and sets a reservation price, both the search effort and the reservation price are coded in x i t . If the firm succeeds in finding an acceptable buyer, the state changes and the firm receives a payment equal to Φ i (x t , ω t , ω t+1 ). In general, Φ i (x t , ω t , ω t+1 ) depends on the nature of the transition (e.g., selling some or all equipment) and may be affected by the search effort of the firm prior to the sale as well as its reservation price. While π i (x t , ω t ) is paid out at the beginning of the period, we assume that Φ i (x t , ω t , ω t+1 ) accrues at the end. This representation of payoffs allows us to capture many features of models of industry dynamics, including entry and exit.
Players discount future payoffs using a discount factor β ∈ [0, 1). The objective of player i is to maximize the expected net present value of its future cash flows
where Φ i (x t , ω t , ω t+1 ) is discounted (relative to π i (x t , ω t )) due to our assumption that it accrues at the end of the period after a change in the state has occurred. 5
As is done in many applications of dynamic stochastic games, we focus on Markov perfect (a.k.a., feedback) equilibria. In period t player i chooses an action x i t that depends solely on the current state ω t . Formally, a Markovian strategy for player i maps the set of possible states Ω into his set of feasible actions X i (ω t ). We further assume that players' actions are chosen simultaneously. Our solution concept is motivated by Bellman's (1957) principle of optimality: Given that all his rivals adopt a Markovian strategy, a player faces a dynamic programming problem and can do no better than to also adopt a Markovian strategy. Thus, a Markov perfect equilibrium remains a subgame perfect equilibrium even if the restriction to Markovian strategies is relaxed.
Let V i (ω) denote the expected net present value of future cash flows to player i if the current state is ω. Suppose that the other players use strategies X −i (ω). Then the Bellman equation for player i is
The Bellman equation adds the current cash flow of player i, π i (x i , X −i (ω) , ω), to the appropriately discounted expected future cash flow,
We set Φ i (x t , ω t , ω t ) = 0 without loss of generality. where the expectation is taken over the successor states ω . Player i's strategy is given by
Each player has his own version of equations (1) and (2). The system of equations defined by the collection of (1) and (2) for each player i = 1, . . . , N and each state ω ∈ Ω defines a Markov perfect equilibrium in pure strategies.
Existence
The extant literature provides a number of existence theorems for discrete-time stochastic games with either discrete (e.g., Fink 1964 , Sobel 1971 , Maskin & Tirole 2001 or continuous actions (e.g., Federgruen 1978 , Whitt 1980 
Continuous-Time Model
We next describe the continuous-time stochastic game with a finite number of states. As in the discrete-time model, the horizon is infinite, the state of the game at time t is ω t ∈ Ω, there are N players, and player i's action at time t is denoted by x i t ∈ X i (ω t ). The key difference is that the state in the continuous-time model follows a controlled continuoustime, finite-state Markov process. In discrete time the time path of the state is a sequence, but in continuous time the path is a piecewise-constant, right-continuous function of time.
Jumps occur at random times according to a controlled Poisson process. At time t the hazard rate of a jump occurring is φ(x t , ω t ) < ∞. 7 If a jump occurs at time t, then the probability that the state moves to ω is f (ω |ω t − , x t − ), where ω t − = lim s→t − ω s is the state 6 In a survey of the literature Breton (1991) laments: "In the zero-sum case, there exist reasonably efficient algorithms, but such is not the case in the general sum N -player case" (p. 56). Using a mathematical programming approach he reports being able to solve, with considerable difficulty, discrete-time stochastic games with up to 3 players, 5 states, and 5 actions per player and state. Most recently, Herings & Peeters (2004) have solved games with up to 5 players, 5 states, and 5 actions per player and state. The smallest applications of EP's framework have hundreds and the largest ones millions of states. The sheer size of the state space alone thus makes them orders of magnitude too large for computing mixed-strategy equilibria.
7 The assumption of a finite hazard rate rules out deterministic state-to-state transitions (see Section 6.5 for details).
just before the jump and x t − = lim s→t − x s are players' actions just before the jump. That is, f (ω |ω t − , x t − ) characterizes the transitions of the induced first-order Markov process.
Since a jump from a state to itself does not change the game, we simply ignore it and instead adjust, without loss of generality, the hazard rate of a jump occurring so that
This decomposition of jumps into a hazard rate and a transition probability is a convenient representation of the controlled continuous-time, finite-state Markov process. Over a short interval of time of length ∆ > 0 the law of motion is
In the special case of independent transitions, player i's state evolves according to 
is the instantaneous change in the wealth of player i at time t if the state moves from ω t − to ω t = ω t − and players' actions just before the jump were x t − . Like the discrete-time model, π i (x t , ω t ) may capture firm i's profit from product market competition net of investment expenses and Φ i (x t − , ω t − , ω t ) the scrap value that the firm receives upon exiting the industry or the setup cost that it incurs upon entering the industry. Unlike the discrete-time model, there is a clear-cut distinction between π i (x t , ω t ) and Φ i (x t − , ω t − , ω t ) in the continuoustime model: π i (x t , ω t ) represents a flow of money, expressed in dollars per unit of time, whereas Φ i (x t − , ω t − , ω t ) represents a change in the stock of wealth, expressed in dollars.
As in the discrete-time game, this representation of payoffs can represent many dynamic phenomena; for example, the Online Appendix gives details on modeling entry and exit in our continuous-time game.
Players discount future payoffs using a discount rate ρ > 0. The objective of player i is to maximize the expected net present value of its future cash flows The remaining aspects of the continuous-time model are similar to the discrete-time model. In particular, although the possibility of two or more players' states changing simultaneously disappears, we continue to assume that players' actions are chosen simultaneously.
We again focus on Markov perfect equilibria. Thus, at time t player i chooses an action x i t that depends solely on the current state ω t . 8 As in the discrete-time model, given that all his rivals adopt a Markovian strategy, a player can do no better than to also adopt a 
which, as ∆ → 0, simplifies to the Bellman equation
8 As is well known, in continuous time there is no natural notion of "a last time before time t," thus rendering induction inapplicable. Because induction is fundamental to defining decision trees, strategies, and outcomes in discrete-time games, in general these notions do not have direct continuous-time analogs and numerous technical difficulties ensue (see, e.g., Simon & Stinchcombe 1989) . To avoid them, we focus on Markov perfect equilibria and assume a finite hazard rate. Consider playing tit-for-tat in a prisoner's dilemma. Due to the latter assumption one cannot construct a state variable that indicates whether a player has cooperated at all times before time t; the most one can do is to loosely track past behavior by having the state variable change with a finite hazard rate as the player switches from cooperation to defection.
Hence, V i (ω) can be interpreted as the asset value to player i of participating in the game. This asset is priced by requiring that the opportunity cost of holding it, ρV i (ω), equals the current cash flow, π i (x i , X −i (ω) , ω), plus the expected capital gain or loss conditional on a jump occurring,
times the hazard rate of a jump occurring, φ(
In the special case of independent transitions, player i solves the problem
Similar to the discrete-time model, player i's strategy is found by carrying out the maximization on the RHS of the Bellman equation (3) or (4).
Existence For the same reason as in the discrete-time model, computational tractability requires the existence of a Markov perfect equilibrium in pure strategies. In what follows we provide sufficient conditions for the existence of such an equilibrium.
We focus our attention on games with continuous actions.
Assumption 1 X i (ω) is non-empty, compact, and convex for all ω and i.
Next we assume that players discount future payoffs.
Assumption 2 ρ > 0.
We further assume that the model's primitives are continuous. 
) the maximand in the Bellman equation (3) or (4) for player i.
To guarantee existence in pure strategies, we finally assume that player i's maximization problem always has a unique solution.
Note that we require that the best reply is unique for arbitrary policies X −i (ω) of the rivals and for arbitrary values V i (·) of the player, both in and out of equilibrium. A sufficient condition for Assumption 4 to hold is that While this is beyond the scope of the present paper, we note that in concrete examples Assumption 4 is often easily verified. In particular, it holds for the quality ladder model that we use in Section 4 to illustrate the computational advantages of continuous time as well as for the variants of the model with entry and exit that we describe in Section 1 of the Online Appendix.
The above assumptions ensure the existence of a computationally tractable equilibrium.
Proposition 1 Under Assumptions 1, 2, 3, and 4, there exists a Markov perfect equilibrium
in pure strategies.
Proof. See Appendix.
Avoiding the Curse of Dimensionality
The key difficulty of the discrete-time model is computing the expectation over successor states in equations (1) and (2). Setting Φ i (X(ω), ω, ω ) = 0 and x i = X i (ω) to simplify the notation, this expectation is
which involves summing over all states ω such that Pr (ω |ω, X(ω)) > 0.
A clean case arises if transitions are independent across players and each transition is restricted to going one level up, one level down, or staying the same, i.e., (ω )
In the literature following EP, for example, it is commonly specified that firm i's state evolves according to law of motion
where τ i ∈ {0, 1} is a binary random variable governed by firm i's investment decision,
, 1} is a firm-specific depreciation shock, and
and
are mutually independent (e.g., Besanko & Doraszelski 2004 , Chen 2004 , Doraszelski & Markovich 2007 ).
This specification may be appropriate in modeling capacity, advertising, or research and development, where setbacks are idiosyncratic. Then the expectation consists of 3 N terms,
More generally, if each player can move to one of K states, then the expectation involves 
In the continuous-time model, we need to sum over a total of 2N terms compared to 3 Another widely used law of motion in the literature following EP holds that firm i's state evolves according to
where η ∈ {0, 1} is an industry-wide depreciation shock and
and η are mutually independent. In the quality ladder model of PM1, η = 1 represents a increase in the quality of the outside good that, given the functional form of demand, is equivalent to a decrease in the qualities of all inside goods. In the model of dynamic cost competition in EP, η = 1 represents an increase in factor prices. Berry & Pakes (1993) , Gowrisankaran terms (conditional on η ∈ {0, 1} the expectation has 2 N terms) compared to N + 1 terms in the continuous-time model (N terms for the investment successes plus another term for the depreciation shock). In the Online Appendix we provide further details on modeling an industry-wide depreciation shock.
Similarly to common shocks, common states that affect the current payoffs of all players are computationally more burdensome in the discrete-than in the continuous-time model. Suppose, for example, that in addition to players' states that describe firm-specific production capacities there is a common state such as industry demand (e.g., Besanko & Doraszelski 2004) . If the common state can move to L possible levels and each player can move to one of K states, then the summation is over LK N terms in discrete time but
It is possible to specify continuous-time models that are as demanding as discrete-time models by explicitly assuming that players' states change simultaneously. Consider a law of motion that assigns equal probability to transitions from any state ω ∈ Ω to any other state
|Ω|−1 in continuous time, then the expectation over successor states involves |Ω| − 1 terms in both cases.
However, the assumption that players' states change simultaneously results a in continuoustime stochastic process that is not comparable to the one underlying EP's framework. As indicated in our previous discussion of widely used laws of motions in EP's framework, there is no correlation in players' states other than that induced by strategic interactions and common shocks. An example may be helpful to illustrate this point. There are two firms and two states per firm, so the state space is Ω = {(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1)}. A firm may move up one level with probability p but never back, i.e., Pr τ i = 1 = p and Pr η i = 1 = 0 in terms of equation (6). The transition probability matrix of the discrete-time Markov chain
It follows that ω 1 t and ω 2 t are uncorrelated in period t. For example, we have
where P [R, C] denotes the element in row R and column C of the matrix P .
Turning to continuous time, let λ be the hazard rate of one firm moving up. In addition, let δ be the hazard rate of both firms moving up. The infinitesimal generator (rate matrix)
of the continuous-time Markov chain is
and the one-period-ahead transition probability matrix is
As long as players' states can change simultaneously, ω 1 t and ω 2 t are correlated at time t. Unless δ = 0 we have, for example,
In sum, while continuous time can accommodate two or more players' states changing simultaneously, this results in a stochastic process that is not comparable to the one underlying EP's framework. Even in this case, however, the computational burden is no greater than that of discrete time. Moreover, the computational burden is often much smaller if one uses comparable specifications of the underlying stochastic processes.
Computational Strategies
Next we present our computational strategies for the discrete-and continuous-time models.
Our approach is similar to PM1, the most widely used algorithm in the literature following EP to solve numerically for a Markov perfect equilibrium. The more general observation is that computing an equilibrium is just the problem of solving a large system of nonlinear equations. If the size of the problem is very large, then a direct application of Newton's method or other solution methods for nonlinear equations is typically impractical, and some type of Gaussian method is necessary. The idea behind Gaussian methods is that it is harder to solve a large system of equations once than to solve smaller systems many times. Thus it may be advantageous to break up the large system into small pieces.
As we have shown in Section 2.3, the fact that the possibility of two or more players'
states changing simultaneously disappears in continuous time results in a simpler model.
Since the equations that characterize the equilibrium are simpler, the computational advantages of continuous time are not tied to a particular algorithm. Any algorithm that works of these equations stands to benefit. This includes the direct application of solution methods for nonlinear equations in Ferris, Judd & Schmedders (2007) and the path-following or homotopy methods in Besanko, Doraszelski, Kryukov & Satterthwaite (2007) .
Discrete-Time Algorithm
The algorithm is iterative. First we order the states in Ω and make initial guesses for the value V i (ω) and the policy X i (ω) of each player i = 1, . . . , N in each state ω ∈ Ω. Then we update these guesses as we proceed through the state space in the prespecified order.
Specifically, in state ω ∈ Ω, given old guesses V i (ω) and X i (ω) we compute new guesseŝ
for each player i = 1, . . . , N as follows:
Note that the old guesses for the policies of player i's opponents, X −i (ω), and the old guess for player i's value, V i (ω), are used when computing the new guessesV i (ω) andX i (ω).
This procedure is, therefore, a Gauss-Jacobi scheme at each state ω ∈ Ω.
There are two ways to update the old guesses V i (ω) and X i (ω). PM1 suggest a GaussJacobi scheme that computes the new guessesV i (ω) andX i (ω) for all players i = 1, . . . , N and all states ω ∈ Ω before replacing the old guesses with the new guesses. Their value function iteration approach is also called a pre-Gauss-Jacobi method in the literature on nonlinear equations (see Judd (1998) for an extensive discussion of Gauss-Jacobi and Gauss-Seidel methods). In contrast to PM1, we employ the block Gauss-Seidel scheme that is typically used for discrete-time stochastic games with a finite number of states (e.g., Benkard 2004). In our block Gauss-Seidel scheme, immediately after computingV i (ω) andX i (ω)
for all players i = 1, . . . , N and a given state ω ∈ Ω, we replace the old guesses with the new guesses for all players in that state. This has the advantage that "information" is used as soon as it becomes available. The algorithm cycles through the state space until the changes in the value and policy functions are small (see Section 5.4 for details).
Continuous-Time Algorithm
In its basic form our computational strategy adapts the block Gauss-Seidel scheme to the continuous-time model. The sole change is that to update players' values and policies in state ω ∈ Ω, we replace equations (8) and (9) bŷ
The remainder of the algorithm proceeds as before. Note that by dividing through by
, we ensure that equation (11) is contractive for a given player (holding fixed the policies of all players) since
as long as the hazard rate is bounded above. Note that the contraction factor varies with players' policies. In the discrete-time model, by contrast, the contraction factor equals the discount factor β. Unfortunately, the system of equations that defines the equilibrium is not contractive, and hence neither our continuous-nor our discrete-time algorithm is guaranteed to converge.
Precomputed Addresses, Symmetry, and Anonymity
The first advantage of continuous time is that it avoids the curse of dimensionality in computing the expectation over successor states. We next describe a way to further speed up this computation. To understand this suggestion we need to briefly discuss the nuts- 
Whereas Ω grows exponentially in N ,Ω grows polynomially. More specifically, the number of states to be examined is reduced from Gowrisankaran & McGuire (1993) and Gowrisankaran (1999b) propose slightly different methods for mapping the elements ofΩ into consecutive integers. These methods form the basis for computing R(ω), but require that ω ∈Ω. While this is achieved by sorting the coordinates of the vector ω, sorting implies that C (ω, i) is no longer always equal to i: Suppose that the state of the game is (1, 1, 3) and that firm 1 moves to state 2. Hence, the state becomes (2, 1, 3) or, after sorting, (1, 2, 3) so that C ((2, 1, 3 ), 1) = 2, C ((2, 1, 3) , 2) = 1, and C ((2, 1, 3 ), 3) = 3. Since evaluating R(ω) and C(ω, i) is rather involved, there is a lot to be gained from precomputed addresses, see 
Model
We use the quality ladder model developed by PM1 to demonstrate the computational advantages of continuous time in Section 5 and to illustrate the conceptual differences between discrete and continuous time in Section 6. Below we first describe their model and then we reformulate it in continuous time. In order to focus on the key issue related to the curse of dimensionality in discrete-time models, we abstract from entry and exit in what follows and set Φ i (x, ω, ω ) = 0. We also differ from PM1 in that our depreciation shocks are independent across firms whereas PM1 assume an industry-wide depreciation shock. In the Online Appendix we describe how to add entry and exit and how to model an industry-wide depreciation shock in continuous time. 
Discrete-Time Model
The quality ladder model assumes that there are N firms with vertically differentiated products engaged in price competition. Firm i produces a product of quality ω i ∈ {1, . . . , M }.
The state space is Ω = {1, . . . , M } N . We first describe price competition and then turn to quality dynamics.
10 Some additional restrictions are needed to obtain a symmetric and anonymous equilibrium. If N = 2, for example, symmetry requires that V 1 (1, 1) = V 2 (1, 1).
Demand Each consumer purchases at most one unit of one product. The utility consumer
maps the quality of the product into the consumer's valuation for it and ik represents taste differences among consumers. There is a no-purchase alternative, product 0, which has utility 0k . We assume that the idiosyncratic shocks 0k , 1k , . . . , N k are independently and identically extreme value distributed across products and consumers; therefore, the demand for firm i's product is
where m > 0 is the size of the market (the measure of consumers).
Price competition In each period, firm i observes the quality of its and its rivals' products and chooses the price p i of product i to maximize profits, thereby solving
where c ≥ 0 is the marginal cost of production. Given a state ω ∈ Ω, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium p 1 (ω), . . . , p N (ω) of the product market game (Caplin & Nalebuff 1991) .
It is found easily by numerically solving the system of first-order conditions corresponding to firms' profit-maximization problems.
Law of motion Firm i's state ω i represents the quality of its product in the present
period. The quality of firm i's product in the subsequent period is governed by its investment x i ≥ 0 in quality improvements and by depreciation. If the investment is successful, then quality increases by one level. The probability of success is αx i 1+αx i , where α > 0 is a measure of the effectiveness of investment. With probability δ ∈ [0, 1] the firm is hit by a depreciation shock and quality decreases by one level.
Combining the investment and depreciation processes, if ω i ∈ {2, . . . , M − 1}, then the quality of firm i's product changes according to the transition probability
Since firm i cannot move further down (up) from the lowest (highest) product quality, we
Payoff function The per-period payoff of firm i is derived from the Nash equilibrium of the product market game and given by
where we have subtracted investment x i from the profit from price competition.
Parameterization As in PM1 the size of the market is m = 5, the marginal cost of production is c = 5, the effectiveness of investment is α = 3, and the depreciation probability is δ = 0.7. We again follow PM1 in first assuming that the discount factor is β = 0.925, which corresponds to a yearly interest rate of 8.1%, and that the number of quality levels per firm is M = 18, but we also examine other values for β and M in Section 5.
Continuous-Time Model
In the interest of brevity, we start by noting that the details of price competition remain unchanged. In the continuous-time model we can thus reinterpret π i (x, ω) as the payoff flow of firm i.
Law of motion Because the discrete-time Markov chain underlying the quality ladder model cannot be embedded into a continuous-time Markov chain (see Section 6.1 for details), the continuous-and discrete-time models cannot be exactly matched. To make the models at least comparable, we use the same law of motion. Therefore, the hazard rate for the investment project of firm i being successful in the continuous-time model is given by αx i 1+αx i , the same choice as for the success probability in the discrete-time model. This is appropriate since the expected time to the first success is 1+αx i αx i in both models (although the variance is generally higher in the continuous-time model). Moreover, our choice of functional form for the success hazard ensures that the marginal incentive to invest in quality improvements and therefore the level of investment is similar in the continuous-and discrete-time models.
Similarly, the depreciation hazard in the continuous-time model equals the depreciation probability, δ, in the discrete-time model. Another possibility is to take the success and depreciation hazards to be ln(1 + αx i ) and − ln(1 − δ), respectively. This choice ensures that the probability of an investment success between time t and time t + 1 is the same as in the discrete-time model. However, because Jumps in firm i's state thus occur according to a Poisson process with hazard rate
and when a jump occurs, firm i's state changes according to the transition probability
Since firm i cannot move further down (up) from the lowest (highest) product quality, we set
Parameterization Whenever possible we use the same parameter values in the continuousas in the discrete-time model. Moreover, we can easily match the discrete-time discount factor β to the continuous-time discount rate ρ: if ∆ is the unit of time in the discrete-time model, then β and ρ are related by β = e −ρ∆ or, equivalently, by ρ = − ln β ∆ . We take ∆ = 1 to obtain ρ = − ln β.
Computational Advantages of Continuous Time
This section illustrates the computational advantages of continuous time using the quality ladder model of Section 4 as an example. Even though this is one specific example, it is useful for many purposes. Second, the results related to the rate of convergence may depend on functional forms and parameter values but there is no reason to believe that our example is atypical. Third, we use our example to illustrate a strategy for diagnosing convergence.
Time per Iteration
Continuous time avoids the curse of dimensionality in the expectation over successor states.
Since the algorithms for both discrete and continuous time perform this computation once for each state and each firm in each iteration, we divide the time it takes to complete one iteration by the number of states and the number of firms. Tables 1 and 2 summarize the results for the three algorithms presented in Section 3-the discrete-time algorithm, the continuous-time algorithm without precomputed addresses, and the continuous-time algorithm with precomputed addresses. 12 Table 1 assumes M = 18 quality levels per firm and up to N = 8 firms just as PM1 do; Table 2 reduces M to 9 in order to accommodate a larger number of firms. Both tables also report the number of states after symmetry and anonymity are invoked,
, and the number of unknowns, which equals one value and one policy per state and firm, along with the ratio of discrete to continuous time without precomputed addresses, the ratio of continuous time without to with precomputed addresses, and the ratio of discrete time to continuous time with precomputed addresses.
Avoiding the curse of dimensionality in the expectation over successor states yields a significant advantage only if this particular computation takes up a large fraction of the running time. Table 1 (Table 2 ).
In sum, the continuous-time algorithms are orders of magnitude faster than their discretetime counterpart for games with more than a few state variables. Most of the gain is from avoiding the curse of dimensionality, but the precomputed addresses, a computational strategy that is effectively constrained to continuous time, also make a significant contribution. Quality ladder model with M = 9 quality levels per firm and a discount factor of 0.925.
Number of Iterations
While each iteration is far faster in the continuous-than in the discrete-time algorithm, this does not prove that the equilibrium of a continuous-time model is faster to compute since the model is not solved until the iterations of the algorithm have converged. There are reasons to think that the continuous-time algorithm needs more iterations to converge. Suppose that the strategic elements in the stochastic game were eliminated, so that it reduces to a disjoint set of single-agent dynamic programming problems. In discrete time, a value function iteration approach (also called a pre-Gauss-Jacobi method) would now converge at rate β. As we have pointed out in Section 3.2, the continuous-time contraction factor
is not constant but varies with players' policies from state to state. It has a simple interpretation: η(X(ω), ω) is the expected net present value of a dollar delivered at the next time the state changes if the current state is ω and players' policies are X(ω). This is easily seen in the special case of ρ φ(X(ω), ω) = 1 since
In general, if the discount rate ρ is large or if the hazard rate φ (X (ω) , ω) is small, then η(X(ω), ω) is small and there is a strong contraction aspect to a value function iteration approach. However, η(X(ω), ω) could be close to one if the discount rate is small or if the hazard rate is large, in which case a value function iteration approach would converge slowly.
, ω i in the special case of independent transitions, this in particular suggests that convergence could be slow if the number of players N is large.
To further explore this issue we require a measure of the distance between two sets of value and policy functions. We want our distance measure to be unit-free and to describe the relative difference. Therefore, we define the L ∞ -relative difference between
We similarly define E X ,X . Table 3 compares the discrete-and continuous-time algorithms. 13,14 It presents the number of iterations until the distance between the current iterateV andX and the "true"
13 Whether or not we use precomputed addresses in continuous time is immaterial for the number of iterations to convergence.
14 The starting values are
and X i (ω) = 0 in discrete time and
and X i (ω) = 0 in continuous time.
solution V ∞ and X ∞ as measured by E V , V ∞ and E X , X ∞ is below a prespecified tolerance of either 10 −4 or 10 −8 . To obtain V ∞ and X ∞ we ran the algorithm until the distance between subsequent iterates as measured by E V , V and E X , X failed to decrease any further. The iterations continued until this distance was less than 10 −13 and, in some cases, less than 10 −15 . The final iterates were considered the true solution since they satisfied the equilibrium conditions essentially up to machine precision. Table 3 : Number of iterations to convergence. Stopping rule is either "distance to truth< 10 −4 " or "distance to truth< 10 −8 ." Quality ladder model with M = 9 quality levels per firm.
In light of our previous discussion we expect the number of iterations to be sensitive to the number of firms and the discount factor. Hence, Table 3 assumes N ∈ {3, 6, 9, 12}
and β = e −ρ ∈ {0.925, 0.98, 0.99, 0.995}. We omit the cases with N = 12 in discrete time because one iteration takes more than 3 hours, thus making it impractical to compute the true solution. We see that the continuous-time algorithm needs more iterations to converge than its discrete-time counterpart, and that this gap widens very slightly as we increase β (decrease ρ). On the other hand, the number of iterations needed by the discrete-time algorithm remains more or less constant as we increase the number of firms whereas the number of iterations needed by the continuous-time algorithm increases rapidly as we go from N = 3 to N = 6. Fortunately, the number of iterations increases slowly as we go from N = 6 to N = 9 and remains more or less constant thereafter, so that the gap between the algorithms stabilizes.
We lastly note that both the discrete-and the continuous-time algorithms always con-verged in case of the quality ladder model as specified in Section 4. Our experience with other models is that sometimes either one or both algorithms fail to converge and that the number of convergence failures is about the same for the two algorithms. 15
Time to Convergence
The continuous-time algorithm suffers an "iteration penalty" because η(X(ω), ω) substantially exceeds the discrete-time discount factor β. Even though the continuous-time algorithm needs more iterations, the loss in the number of iterations is small when compared to the gain from avoiding the curse of dimensionality. Table 4 The stochastic approximation algorithm suggested by PM2 is another effort to alleviate the burden of computing equilibria of dynamic stochastic games. To break the curse of dimensionality in discrete-time games, they create approximations to players' expectations over all possible future states and update them each time a state is visited by a random draw from the set of successor states. Similar to Monte Carlo integration, many visits to a state are required to reduce the approximation error to an acceptable level and obtain useful estimates of these expectations. In addition, PM2 address a separate issue in computing equilibria, namely the large size of the state space, by tracking the states that appear to be visited frequently in equilibrium, i.e., are in the ergodic set, and ignoring the rest. Since the number of states is independent of the concept of time we do not pursue this idea and instead simply note that our continuous-time algorithm can be extended to target the ergodic set and that this may result in further speedups in some applications. 16
Since PM2 exploit this additional idea besides stochastic approximation whereas we 15 There are a number of things one can try to facilitate convergence. First, dampening may help to "smooth out" the path that the algorithm takes, see footnote 18 of PM1 and Chapter 3 of Judd (1998) for details. Second, the Stein-Rosenberg theorem asserts, at least for certain systems of linear equations, that if the Gauss-Jacobi algorithm fails to converge then so does the Gauss-Seidel algorithm (see, e.g., Proposition 6.9 in Section 2.6 of Bertsekas & Tsitsiklis 1997) . This suggests that a Gauss-Jacobi scheme such as PM1 may be less prone to convergence failures than our Gauss-Seidel scheme. Third, one may solve out for the Nash equilibrium in each state rather than rely on the iterative best reply approach of our algorithm, see Chen, Doraszelski & Harrington (2007) .
16 Many applications require the equilibrium to be known at states outside the ergodic set. For example, in studying the effect of a change in antitrust policy, the initial state generated by the old regime may not be in the ergodic set induced by the equilibrium under the new regime, so that the transition from the old to the new regime cannot be captured accurately unless the equilibrium is computed at the transient states. In practice, this can be done via multiple restarts of the PM2 algorithm, but at a cost. Moreover, the ergodic set is large in many dynamic stochastic games and there is thus little gain from restricting attention to it. In Doraszelski & Markovich (2007) , for example, the ergodic set consists of the entire state space. Finally, as PM2 acknowledge, their algorithm needs to be significantly altered in order to solve models in which behavior depends on players' values and policies "off the equilibrium path," as is typically the case in models of collusion, since off-path states are by definition never visited in equilibrium (PM2, p. 1278). Table 4 : Time to convergence. (k) is shorthand for ×10 k . Stopping rule is "distance to truth< 10 −4 ." Entries in italics are based on an estimated 119 iterations to convergence in discrete time. Quality ladder model with M = 9 quality levels per firm and a discount factor of 0.925.
focus on the problem of computing the expectation over successor states, it is difficult to compare their algorithm with our continuous-time approach. However, to give the reader some basis for comparison, we note that PM2 report that their algorithm cuts running time roughly in half (relative to PM1) in a 6-firm quality ladder model where the ergodic set comprises about 3.3% of all states. They also project that it reduces running time by a factor of 250 in a 10-firm quality ladder model where the ergodic set contains 0.4% of all states. In contrast, our continuous-time approach avoids approximations altogether, computes the equilibrium on the entire state space, and yet reduces running time by a factor of 12 and 524, respectively.
Stopping Rules
It is rarely feasible to compute the true solution V ∞ and X ∞ . Rather the algorithm is terminated once the distance between subsequent iterates, E V , V and E X , X , is deemed sufficiently small. The problem is that the distance to the true solution, E V , V ∞ and E X , X ∞ , may be much larger than the distance between subsequent iterates. This makes it hard to tell whether the algorithm has provided us with a reasonable approximation to an equilibrium. Below we describe a stopping rule that uses a careful examination of the iteration history in order to assess the accuracy of the computations.
As we have pointed out in Section 3.2, neither the discrete-nor the continuous-time algorithm is guaranteed to converge. However, if the algorithm does converge, then convergence is linear as in all Gaussian schemes (Ortega & Rheinboldt 1970, p. 301) . Consider therefore a sequence {z l } ∞ l=0 that converges linearly to the limit z ∞ , so that
Suppose the first inequality can be strengthened to hold along the entire sequence of iterates,
i.e., z l+1 − z ∞ ≤ θ z l − z ∞ for all l; this contraction property is similar to dynamic programming except that we do not a priori know the convergence factor θ. Then the distance to the limit is related to the distance between subsequent iterates by ||z l − z ∞ || ≤
. Hence, to ensure that the current iterate is within a prespecified tolerance of the limit, we can stop once
The key is to estimate the convergence factor from past iterates. We let k be the first iteration such that ||z k − z k−1 || < 10 and l the first iteration such that ||z l − z l−1 || < to produce the estimateθ
Equations (13) and (14) together comprise the adaptive stopping rule. It contrasts with the widely used ad hoc rule of stopping once Table 5 compares the two stopping rules with = 10 −4 . For the sake of brevity, we focus on the continuous-time quality ladder model; the results for discrete time are similar and can be found in the Online Appendix. In all cases, the adaptive rule outperforms the ad hoc rule. The ad hoc rule prematurely terminates the algorithm although the distance to the true solution exceeds the prespecified tolerance by up to three orders of magnitude.
In contrast, the adaptive rule usually terminates the algorithm once the distance to the true solution is smaller than the prespecified tolerance, and it is always within an order of magnitude. Because we do not know the exact value of the convergence factor, there are cases in which our adaptive rule stops early (e.g., N = 3 and β = 0.995). We note, however, that our estimator in equation (14) is quite crude and can be improved at little cost (Judd 1998, pp. 42-44) . Overall, Table 5 clearly shows the importance of having a reliable stopping rule.
ad hoc rule Continuous-time quality ladder model with M = 9 quality levels per firm.
Conceptual Differences between Continuous and Discrete Time
In Section 5 we have emphasized the computational advantages of continuous time. From the point of view of theory continuous-time models are similar to discrete-time models with short periods. In practice, however, periods are long in discrete-time models due to computational considerations as discussed in Section 5.2. Moreover, the discretetime Markov chains underlying many applications of EP's framework cannot be embedded into continuous-time Markov chains, so that these models cannot be exactly matched to continuous-time models. As a result, a continuous-and a discrete-time formulation of the same economic problem may differ and sometimes one or the other approach is preferable.
Below we first clarify the notion of embeddability and then note some of the conceptual differences between discrete-and continuous-time models. Next we compare the equilibrium behavior of players and the dynamics implied by that behavior using the quality ladder model of Section 4 as an example. We finally note some limitations of continuous-time models.
Embeddability
It is clear that any continuous-time Markov chain induces a discrete-time Markov chain. In particular, if Q is the infinitesimal generator (rate matrix) of the continuous-time Markov chain, then P = exp(Q) is the transition probability matrix of a discrete-time Markov chain such that the t-step transition probability matrix P t of the discrete-time Markov chain equals the transition probability matrix exp(Qt) of the continuous-time Markov chain for all t = 0, 1, 2, . . .. However, we cannot always go in the other direction. This is known as the embedding problem (Elfving 1937 Singer & Spilerman (1976) ).
There is thus no easy way to align discrete-and continuous-time Markov chains.
While the embedding problem is essentially unresolved, it is known that a discrete-time Markov chain cannot be embedded into a continuous-time Markov chain if there are states ω and ω such that the corresponding entry in the transition probability matrix P is zero but nonzero in the t-step transition probability matrix P t for some t = 2, 3, 4, . . . (Chung 1967, p. 126) . Many dynamic stochastic games such as the quality ladder model of Section 4 restrict players' transitions to immediately adjacent states. This assumption imposes a sense of continuity-a player cannot go from state 3 to state 5 without passing through state 4-although the number of states is finite. The "continuity" assumption gives rise to a discrete-time Markov chain that cannot be embedded into a continuous-time Markov chain because, even though a player cannot go from state 3 to state 5 in one period, the player can go to state 5 in two periods.
It is worth noting that the "continuity" assumption that precludes embeddability is often made to limit the computational burden of discrete-time models and may be undesirable in some applications. Consider, for example, a model of advertising such as Doraszelski & Markovich (2007) . In this model, the more a firm invests in advertising, the higher is the probability that its campaign succeeds in adding a unit of goodwill to its stock. Intuitively one suspects, however, that a firm's advertising budget determines not only whether but also how much goodwill is created: a run-of-the-mill TV spot may differ greatly from Superbowl advertising in this respect. Substantive considerations therefore suggest transitions to more than immediately adjacent states. However, increasing the number of states, K, that a player can move to from one period to the next is costly in discrete-time models because it increases the number of terms, K N , in the expectation over successor states and thus aggravates the curse of dimensionality.
The "continuity" assumption may similarly be questionable in modeling the depreciation of machinery. Suppose that firm i owns ω i machines and that each machine has a probability of µ per period of breaking down independent of other machines. Then firm i will own anywhere from 0 to ω i machines next period, so that (ω ) i is binomially distributed with support 0, 1, . . . , ω i . This discrete-time model of proportional depreciation implies a Markov chain that is embeddable but aggravates the curse of dimensionality because the expectation over successor states is now comprised of N i=1 (ω i + 1) terms in an industry with N firms. 17 In the corresponding continuous-time model each machine has a hazard rate ofμ = − ln(1 − µ) of breaking down independent of other machines, so that the hazard rate of a jump occurring in firm i's state isμω i . Note that because the machines owned by the N firms break down one at a time computing the expectation over successor states still involves summing over N terms.
State Changes
Discrete-and continuous-time models differ in how often and how much a state variable can change over a finite interval of time. In discrete-time models a state variable can change at most once per period, so the number of changes is bounded. In continuous-time models, by contrast, the number of changes over a finite interval of time is not bounded. This may or may not be appropriate depending on the institutional and technological details of the economic problem under study. Rigidities in the decision-making process could put a limit on change, for example, if decisions are made by a board of directors that meets at fixed times or if there are contractual obligations that lock a firm into its decision for a period of time.
In order to allow for a larger number of changes over a finite interval of time in discretetime models, one could think about shortening the length of a period by taking the discount factor close to one. However, as Table 3 shows, the number of iterations to convergence increases with β. Taking β close to one is thus a costly way to model short periods. In contrast, in continuous-time models the length of a period is zero and completely independent of the discount rate ρ.
Besides restricting how often a state variable can change over a finite interval of time, discrete-time models also force the changes to take place at regular intervals, a sometimes useful feature. Consider the automobile industry. Automobile manufacturers launch new models at more or less the same time in early fall of each year, a fact that can be easily captured in a discrete-time model but, without explicitly accounting for the reasons behind it, not in a continuous-time model. On the other hand, this feature of discrete-time models makes it harder to interpret data that does not arrive at regular intervals. For example, plant openings and closings do not all take place on the same day but instead are spread out over the year.
Turning from the number of changes to their size, note that the "continuity" assumption has different consequences for discrete-and continuous-time models. In discrete-time models it implies that a state variable changes by at most one unit in any given period. Hence, a 17 An often used shortcut is to choose up to two states in the support of (ω ) i along with probabilities of transiting to them such that in expectation firm i will own µω i machines next period (see, e.g., Benkard 2004) . While this matches the mean, it misses most higher-order moments, and again precludes embeddability. minimum of n periods is required for a change of n units. In continuous-time models, by contrast, the "continuity" assumption just says that the state variable changes by one unit at a time, but these changes "add up." Continuous time thus allows for a richer range of outcomes over a finite interval of time.
In sum, in discrete-time models it is commonly assumed that a player can change its state by at most one unit during a period of at least a year (recall that the discount factor is small in EP, PM1, and PM2) and, consequently, cannot change its behavior for that length of time. This may be questionable when it comes to price or quantity competition or decisions about advertising or hiring. On the other hand, if the economic problem under study suggests that there are bounds on how often and how much a state variable can change over a finite interval of time, then a discrete-time model is preferable since a continuous-time model cannot make such guarantees.
Strategic Interactions
The nature of strategic interactions may also be different in discrete-and continuous-time models and has to be considered in choosing an appropriate formulation of an economic problem. Suppose that two firms are both trying to expand their capacity. In a discretetime model there is some chance that both firms succeed in a given period. This may result in excess capacity, make both firms regret their investments, and perhaps even spur some efforts to disinvest. "Mistakes" like this cannot happen in a continuous-time model since at most one firm succeeds at a given point in time and the other promptly adjusts by stopping its investment.
In what follows we assume that players make decisions in a discrete-time model at the beginning of the period whereas state-to-state transitions take place at the end, say because it takes a period for an investment project to come to fruition. 18 If so, then a player may also react right away to a change in a rival's state at the end of period t − 1 by changing its action at the beginning of period t, but the player must wait at least a period before this brings about a change in its own state. In many applications of EP's framework such as the quality ladder model of Section 4 the state space is fairly coarse. Thus, a change in the state has a large effect on the strategic situation, and while a lag of a few days, weeks, or even months may be plausible, a lag of one or more years is often not. In a continuous-time model, by contrast, a player may adjust its action to bring about a change in its own state much more quickly. This difference in the ability of players to respond may substantially affect the equilibrium since a player's actions are contingent on its rivals' reactions. Whether the rapid response of a continuous-time model or the delayed response of a discrete-time model is deemed a better approximation depends on the economic problem at hand.
Equilibrium and Dynamics
Given the conceptual differences between discrete-and continuous-time models noted above, we now ask how the equilibrium behavior of firms and the dynamics implied by that behavior change as the discrete-time quality ladder model is recast in continuous time. Figure 1: Equilibrium value (upper panels) and policy functions (lower panels). Discrete-(left panels) and continuous-time (right panels) quality ladder model with N = 2 firms, M = 18 quality levels per firm, and a discount factor of 0.925. the most obvious difference is that a low-quality firm has a lower value and invests less in the discrete-time model (left panels) than in the continuous-time model (right panels). For example, we have V 1 (1, 9) = 0.43 and x 1 (1, 9) = 0.09 in discrete time and V 1 (1, 9) = 16.44 and x 1 (1, 9) = 0.58 in continuous time. The reason is that in the discrete-time model a minimum of n periods is required for a change of n units in a state variable. Hence, the firm is stuck in states with low quality and thus low profit from product market competition for a long time. In contrast, the continuous-time model does not limit how often and how much a state variable can change over a finite interval of time, so that, by investing more heavily, the firm is able to more quickly reach states with high quality.
The second difference is that the peak of investment around state (4, 1) is lower in the continuous-time model. In fact, the policy functions differ most in state (4, 1) and the value functions in state (6, 1) with x 1 (4, 1) = 4.16 and V 1 (6, 1) = 272.91 in discrete time and x 1 (4, 1) = 2.94 and V 1 (6, 1) = 168.83 in continuous time. As firm 1 enjoys an advantage over firm 2 in state (4, 1), it has an incentive to further invest in quality improvements in order to cement its leadership position. But in the continuous-time model the follower is able to more quickly catch up to the leader. This renders the leadership position more tentative and consequently less valuable and, in turn, diminishes the leader's incentive to invest.
From the equilibrium policy function we construct the probability distribution over next period's state (ω ) 1 , (ω ) 2 given this period's state ω 1 , ω 2 , i.e., the transition probability matrix that characterizes the discrete-time In Table 6 we list the most likely industry structure (modal state) and its probability at various points in time. In the discrete-time model, in the short run the industry evolves either in a symmetric or in an asymmetric fashion. However, even if a firm is able to gain the upper hand over its rival in the short run, in the long run the most likely industry structure is symmetric and the limiting distribution leaves little probability mass on asymmetric industry structures (see again Figure 2 ). In the continuous-time model, the dynamics of the industry exhibit greater variability, thus making it less likely that a firm can sustain a pronounced advantage over its rival for an extended period of time. We finally report in Table 6 a firm's expected profit from product market competition and its expected investment in quality improvements along with their standard deviations. These statistics are mostly similar, except that early on expected profits are higher in the continuous-time model due to the fact that a firm is able to more quickly reach states with high quality. 20
19 Let P be the M 2 × M 2 transition probability matrix in the discrete-time model. The 1 × M 2 transient distribution in period t is given by µ t = µ 0 P t , where µ 0 is the 1 × M 2 initial distribution and P t the t th matrix power of P . The Markov process turns out to be irreducible. That is, all its states belong to a single closed communicating class and the 1 × M 2 limiting distribution µ ∞ solves the system of linear equations µ ∞ = µ ∞ P . In the continuous-time model let Q be the infinitesimal generator. The transient distribution at time t is given by µ t = µ 0 exp(Qt) and the limiting distribution µ ∞ solves the system of linear equations 0 = µ ∞ Q. 20 While we have always found just one equilibrium for a given parameterization of the quality ladder model, there is generally no reason to expect the equilibrium to be unique. This raises the question whether Table 6 : Most likely industry structure and its probability, expected profit and investment and their standard deviations. Discrete-(upper panel) and continuous-time (lower panel) quality ladder model with N = 2 firms, M = 18 quality levels per firm, and a discount factor of 0.925.
Limitations: Calendar Time and Deterministic Transitions
Suppose that there are predictable seasonal fluctuations in demand or cost. In the automobile industry, for example, the model year begins in the early fall with strong demand.
Afterwards demand gradually weakens. Because the time within the year determines demand, it is a state variable. Another example is the collusion model of Fershtman & Pakes (2005) . In their model, a firm's cost is privately known. The cartel meets when one of its members calls for a meeting, whereupon each firm discloses its cost and output is allocated.
Between meetings each firm invests to reduce its cost, but this is not observed by other firms. The elapsed time since the last meeting is a state variable because a firm's uncertainty about its rivals' costs rises with it. Calendar time is easily handled in a discrete-time model because discrete time adds just another discrete state variable. In contrast, continuous time adds a continuous state variable. Since our continuous-time approach is based on a finite number of states, it cannot directly model calendar time. 21
The continuous-time approach is also limited to stochastic state-to-state transitions.
the set of equilibria differs between discrete-and continuous-time models. Unfortunately, this question is difficult to answer absent a method for computing all equilibria of a dynamic stochastic game. Suppose a firm is guaranteed an investment success at a cost ofx. Given the "lumpy" nature of investment, the firm spends either zero and stays put orx and moves up one state. Such a deterministic transition corresponds to a transition probability of one and can thus in principle be modeled in discrete time whereas in continuous time it requires an infinite hazard rate. 22
From a practical point of view, however, lumpy investment also poses difficulties for discrete time because the existence of an equilibrium cannot generally be ensured without allowing for computationally burdensome mixed strategies. The same issue arises if it is assumed that exit (entry) takes place for sure upon receiving (paying) a certain scrap value (setup cost) because this entails that an incumbent firm (potential entrant) transits deterministically to an "inactive" state (initial state). To avoid the need for mixed entry/exit strategies in the context of EP's framework, build on Harsanyi's (1973) insight that a perturbed game of incomplete information can purify the mixed-strategy equilibria of an underlying game of complete information. They therefore assume that an incumbent firm (potential entrant) draws a random scrap value (setup cost) in each period. Its scrap value (setup cost) is known to the firm but unknown to its rivals.
Its rivals thus perceive the firm as if it was following a mixed entry/exit strategy. The same idea has also been applied to construct computationally tractable models with lumpy investment (Ryan 2005 , Besanko, Doraszelski, Lu & Satterthwaite 2006 . It also carries over to continuous time if it is assumed that an incumbent firm (potential entrant) draws a random scrap value (setup cost) at random times instead of in each period. In the Online Appendix we show how to model entry and exit in continuous time along these lines.
Concluding Remarks
Discrete-time stochastic games with a finite number of states suffer from a curse of dimensionality in computing players' expectations over all possible future states in that their computational burden increases exponentially in the number of state variables. We develop the alternative of continuous-time stochastic games with a finite number of states and demonstrate that they avoid the curse of dimensionality, thereby speeding up the computations by orders of magnitude for games with more than a few state variables. We further speed up the computations with precomputed addresses, a computational strategy that is effectively constrained to continuous time. Besides their computational advantages, continuous-time games have a number of features that may be useful in modeling dynamic 22 Whether an investment success can indeed be guaranteed or whether there always remains some uncertainty as in the quality ladder model in Section 4 undoubtedly depends on the type of investment one has in mind. Pakes (1994) , for example, contends: "One might argue the relevance of the special deterministic case for investment in physical capital, but it seems much less appropriate for the accumulation of 'intangible' capital stocks that emanate from a firm's investment in research and exploration, or in advertising and goodwill. Here the randomness in the outcome from the investment activities often seem ... to have strikingly large variances" (p. 177). Turning from Υ V (·) to Υ X (·), fix ω and i. The theorem of the maximum also yields that Υ X,i,ω (·) is a non-empty, compact-valued, and upper hemi-continuous correspondence. Moreover, Υ X,i,ω (·) is single-valued by Assumption 4. Thus Υ X,i,ω (·) is a continuous function of V (·) and X(·) that maps into X i (ω).
